



STATE OF WISCONSIN
Division of Hearings and Appeals

In the Matter of

Milwaukee County Department of Human Services, Petitioner

vs.

DECISION

██████████ Respondent

Case #: FOF - 173149

Pursuant to petition filed March 25, 2016, under Wis. Admin. Code §HA 3.03, and 7 C.F.R. § 273.16, to review a decision by the Milwaukee County Department of Human Services to disqualify ██████████ from receiving FoodShare benefits (FS) for a period of one year, a hearing was held on Friday, May 13, 2016 at 09:45 AM, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).

There appeared at that time the following persons:

PARTIES IN INTEREST:

Petitioner:

Department of Health Services
1 West Wilson Street, Room 651
Madison, WI 53703

By:

██████████
Milwaukee Enrollment Services
1220 W. Vliet Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53205

Respondent:

██████████
██████████
██████████

█

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

David D. Fleming
Division of Hearings and Appeals

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The respondent (CARES # ██████████) is a resident of Milwaukee County who also received FS benefits in Milwaukee County in or about the month of November 2012.

2. Due to the respondent's enrollment in the FS program, the respondent was issued a QUEST card which the respondent utilized to access her monthly FS allotment provided to respondent. QUEST cards are electronic benefit transfer cards that replaced food stamp coupon booklets.
3. The following transactions were made using Quest card with the last 4 digits of [REDACTED] with [REDACTED]:

11/09/12	\$100.00
11/13/12	\$139.00
4. Agency records submitted at the hearing indicate that the card ending [REDACTED] was issued on November 14, 2013. A post hearing submission indicates it was issued March 1, 2011.
5. [REDACTED] was a licensed vendor of the United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, which enabled it to redeem QUEST cards.
6. [REDACTED] was classified as a mobile vendor and operated out of private vehicles. Between August, 2010 and January, 2013, [REDACTED] redeemed approximately \$778,000 in QUEST benefits from food stamp benefit recipients who were not purchasing food, but instead receiving cash for providing access to their QUEST benefits.
7. On or about February 15, 2013, [REDACTED], doing business as [REDACTED], pled guilty to a charge of unlawfully purchasing and redeeming FS benefits. [REDACTED] admitted that no food or groceries were ever provided by [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] in exchange for Quest benefits.
8. On April 11, 2016 the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that respondent intentionally transferred FS benefits to [REDACTED], in the total amount of \$239.00, in exchange for cash payment(s).

DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts;
or
2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, § 3.14.1; *see also* 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§ 946.92(2).

Wisconsin statutes prohibit the intentional exchange of FS benefits for cash. The law specifically provides that to traffic food stamp program benefits means to do any of the following:

Buy, sell, steal, or otherwise accomplish the exchange of, directly, indirectly, in collusion with others, or individually, food stamp program benefits issued and accessed through the electronic benefit transfer program under s. 49.797, or by manual voucher and signature, for cash or other consideration that is not food.

Wis. Stat. §946.92(1)(dm); *see also*, 7 C.F.R. § 271.5(b).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first

violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b).

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. ...

Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205 is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that “yes” should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. “Reasonable certainty” means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the “middle burden.” The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that “it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable.” 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4th ed. 1992).

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence, a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may exist a reasonable doubt that the opposite is true.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. See, *John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

Respondent did appear for this hearing. She denied making the John Henry transaction. She testified that she had a relationship with a boyfriend beginning in 2009 but that it ended in 2014. Between those years they lived together. She believes that he used the card to make the transaction involved here. While the lapse of time may have left Respondent with less than a precise memory as to what specifically happened well over 3 years prior to the hearing, I found her testimony to be credible. I also note that there is an issue regarding card numbers. The Exhibits showing card issuance history are confusing and there is no evidence to explain it. Exhibit C shows the card used was issued after the date of the use. The post hearing submission does show that it was issued prior to

the use date. One of these is wrong and it calls into question the preparation of Exhibit C and the post hearing submission. Are these original records? Are they compiled by agency personnel so there was a mistake made? One of the problems with a post hearing submission is that there is no opportunity to ask questions about it. With the standard of proof being clear and convincing, I cannot conclude that the available evidence in this record is sufficient to meet that burden.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

That the evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent made the transaction with [REDACTED] that was the subject of this hearing.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED

That this matter is remanded to the agency with instructions to cease any effort to impose an intentional program violation sanction against Respondent for the transaction that was the subject of this hearing.

APPEAL TO COURT


You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be filed with the Court **and** served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, **and** on those identified in this decision as “PARTIES IN INTEREST” **no more than 30 days after the date of this decision** or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).

The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, this 10th day of June, 2016

\sDavid D. Fleming
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Miles - email
Public Assistance Collection Unit - email
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email
[REDACTED] - email



State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

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The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on June 10, 2016.

Milwaukee Enrollment Services
Public Assistance Collection Unit
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability
[REDACTED]@dhs.wisconsin.gov